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Abstract
In cryptography, attacks that utilize a Gro¨bner basis have broken sev-
eral cryptosystems. The complexity of computing a Gro¨bner basis domi-
nates the overall computing and its estimation is important for such crypt-
analysis. The complexity is given by using the solving degree, but it is
hard to decide this value of a large scale system arisen from cryptography.
Thus the degree of regularity and the first fall degree are used as proxies
for the solving degree based on a wealth of experiments. If a given system
is semi-regular, the complexity is estimated by using the degree of reg-
ularity derived from a certain power series, otherwise, by using the first
fall degree derived from a construction of a syzygy. The degree of regu-
larity is also defined on a non-semi-regular system and is experimentally
larger than the first fall degree, but those relation is not clear theoretically.
Moreover, in contrast to the degree of regularity, the first fall degree has
been investigated specifically for each cryptosystem and its discussion on
generic systems is not given. In this paper, we show an upper bound for
the first fall degree of a polynomial system over a sufficiently large field.
In detail, we prove that this upper bound for a non-semi-regular system
is the degree of regularity. Moreover, we prove that the upper bound
for a multi-graded polynomial system is a certain value only decided by
its multi-degree. Furthermore, we show that the condition for the order
of a field in our results is satisfied in attacks against actual multivariate
cryptosystems. Consequently, under a reasonable condition for the order
of a field, we clear a relation between the first fall degree and the degree
of regularity and provide a theoretical method using a multivariate power
series for cryptanalysis.
1 Introduction
A Gro¨bner basis algorithm that computes a Gro¨bner basis of the ideal generated
by a given polynomial system was discovered by B. Buchberger. It gives not only
a foundation of computation in commutative ring theory and algebraic geometry
∗Department of Liberal Arts and Basic Sciences, Nihon University, 1-2-1 Izumi-cho,
Narashino, Chiba 275-8575, Japan (E-mail: nakamura.shuhei@nihon-u.ac.jp)
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
14
72
9v
1 
 [c
s.S
C]
  2
9 J
ul 
20
20
but also applications in several other fields (e.g. code theory, cryptography,
statics, robotics). In particular, in multivariate cryptography, there exist several
attacks using a Gro¨bner basis algorithm.
Multivariate cryptography [9] is based on an NP-complete problem of solving
a system of quadratic equations, that is called the MQ problem [19]. It is espe-
cially expected to have potential in building post-quantum signature schemes,
and has been considered in NIST PQC standardization project [24]. A Gro¨bner
basis algorithm is used in attacks such as the direct attack [2], the Rainbow-
Band-Separation attack [10], the MinRank attack with the Kipnis-Shamir mod-
eling [20] and the Minors modeling [17]. Since the complexity of computing a
Gro¨bner basis often dominates the overall complexity of an attack, its estimation
is important to security analysis against such attacks.
A Gro¨bner basis algorithm in an attack is used for solving a system of poly-
nomial equations derived from a cryptosystem. Its complexity depends on the
solving degree, that is the maximal degree required to compute the Gro¨bner
basis, but it is an experimental value. In order to estimate the complexity of
solving a large scale polynomial system derived from a cryptosystem, we need
to consider a theoretical proxy for the solving degree. The degree of regularity
[1] and the first fall degree [13] are well-known as such proxies.
For a semi-regular polynomial system which generalizes a regular sequence in
an overdetermined case, the degree of regularity introduced by M. Barded et al.
[1] is given by the degree Dreg of the first term whose coefficient is non-positive
in the power series ∏m
i=1(1− tdi)
(1− t)n ,
where d1, . . . , dm and n are the degrees and the number of the variables of the
system, respectively. By the concept, a Gro¨bner basis for a semi-regular system
is computed within Dreg . Since the value Dreg approximates its solving degree
tightly and is simply computed by the power series, the degree of regularity
is widely used for complexity estimation. On the other hand, there exist non-
semi-regular systems in cryptography such as the public quadratic system of the
HFE scheme [25] and quadratic systems solved in the Rainbow-Band-Separation
attack and the MinRank attack with the Kipnis-Shamir modeling.
For a non-semi-regular system appeared in cryptography, its Gro¨bner ba-
sis is often computed within a smaller degree than the degree of regularity.
Namely, its solving degree is smaller than the degree of regularity. For a poly-
nomial system whose components have the same degree, the first fall degree
introduced by V. Dubois and N. Gama [13] is defined by using its syzygies
and captures the first degree at which occurs a non-trivial degree fall during
the computing a Gro¨bner basis. Since it often approximates the solving degree
of a non-semi-regular system appeared in cryptography, the first fall degree is
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used for complexity estimation, but deciding its actual value is hard. Thus, in
previous estimations [11, 28], an upper bound for the first fall degree has been
investigated by constructing a non-trivial syzygy. These estimations depend on
each cryptosystem and there is no a general estimation for the first fall degree.
Moreover, a relation with the degree of regularity is not clear theoretically.
1.1 Our contribution
In this paper, we show an upper bound for the first fall degree of a polynomial
system over a sufficiently large field. In detail, we prove that this upper bound
for a non-semi-regular system is the degree of regularity. Moreover, we introduce
a value DZs≥0 using a multivariate power series and prove that the upper bound
for a multi-graded polynomial system is this value DZs≥0 . Polynomial systems
solved in the Rainbow-Band-Separation attack and the MinRank attack with
the Kipnis-Shamir modeling are multi-graded, and we further show that the
condition for the order of a field in our results is satisfied in these attacks against
multivariate cryptosystems proposed in NIST PQC 2nd round. In particular,
our result gives a theoretical background for the precise security analysis in
[22, 23] since their values are specific cases of DZs≥0 . Consequently, under a
reasonable condition for the order of a field, we clear a relation between the first
fall degree and the degree of regularity and provide a theoretical method using
a multivariate power series for cryptanalysis.
1.2 Organization
In this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall some fundamen-
tal concepts in commutative ring theory and the complexity estimation for a
Gro¨bner basis algorithm in multivariate cryptography. In Section 3, we prove
that the first fall degree of a non-semi-regular system is smaller than the degree
of regularity if the order of the field is sufficiently large. In Section 4, we prove
that the first fall degree of a multi-graded polynomial system is bounded by a
certain value derived from its multi-degree if the order of the field is sufficiently
large. In Section 5, we conclude our results.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some fundamental concepts in commutative ring theory
and the complexity estimation for a Gro¨bner basis algorithm.
3
2.1 Fundamental concepts in commutative ring theory
A (finite generated) commutative ring R is said to be Zs-graded if it has a
decomposition R =
⊕
d∈Zs Rd such that Rd1Rd2 ⊆ Rd1+d2 for any di ∈ Zs. In
this paper, we assume always that Rd = {0} if d ∈ Zs has a negative component.
Then we call R a Zs≥0-graded commutative ring. An element h in Rd is said to
be Zs≥0-homogeneous, or simply homogeneous and then we denote d by degZs≥0 h
and call it the Zs≥0-degree of h. If R0 is a field, put
HSR(t) =
∑
d∈Zs≥0
(dimR0 Rd) · td ∈ Z≥0[[t1, . . . , ts]],
where d = (d1, . . . , ds) and t
d = td11 · · · tdss which is called a (multivariate)
Hilbert series. For a Zs≥0-graded commutative ring R, its quotient ring with an
ideal generated by Zs≥0-homogeneous elements is Zs≥0-graded. For example, the
polynomial ring F[x1, . . . ,xs] is Zs≥0-graded by degZs≥0 xij = (0, . . . , 0,
i
1, 0, . . . , 0),
where xi = {xi1, . . . , xini}. Then we have a decomposition F[x1, . . . ,xs] =⊕
d∈Zs≥0 F[x1, . . . ,xs]d where F[x1, . . . ,xs]d is the vector space over F gen-
erated by the monomials of Zs≥0-degree d. When s = 1, for a polynomial
f in F[x1, . . . , xn] and a well-ordering < on Z≥0, we consider a expression
f =
∑
d fd where fd ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn]d and call its homogeneous component of
degree max<{d | fd 6= 0} its top homogeneous component. When degZ≥0 xi = 1,
the polynomial ring is said to be standard graded and we denote degZ≥0 f as
deg f . In this paper, we mainly treat with a homogeneous case and call an ele-
ment of F[x1, . . . , xn]m a system. Moreover, we call a system whose components
are homogeneous a homogeneous system.
Let R be a commutative ring. For (h1, . . . , hm) ∈ Rm, we define an R-module
homomorphism
Rm → R, (b1, . . . , bm) 7→
m∑
i=1
bihi.
Then we denote by SyzR(h1, . . . , hm), or simply Syz(h1, . . . , hm), the kernel
of this homomorphism and its element is called a syzygy of (h1, . . . , hm). For
example,
piij := (0, . . . , 0,−hj
i
, 0, . . . , 0, hi
j
, 0, . . . , 0),
where 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m, is such an element. Here, we denote by KSyz(h1, . . . , hm)
the submodule generated by the elements piij and its element is called a Koszul
syzygy. Let R be a Zs≥0-graded commutative ring. For Zs≥0-homogeneous ele-
ments h1, . . . , hm ∈ R with di = degZs≥0 hi and the free module E = Rm with
the standard basis {e1, . . . , em}, we denote by Ki the i-th exterior power
∧i
E
and give the Koszul complex
K(h1, . . . , hm)• : · · · δ4→ K3 δ3→ K2 δ2→ K1 δ1→ R→ 0
4
by δl(ei1 ∧ · · · ∧ eil) =
∑l
k=1(−1)k+1hikei1 ∧ · · · ∧ eik−1 ∧ eik+1 ∧ · · · ∧ eil . Then
we denote by Hi(K(h1, . . . , hm)•) the i-th homology group of the complex and
by Hi(K(h1, . . . , hm)•)d its component of degree d. Note that
H1(K(h1, . . . , hm)•)d = Syz(h1, . . . , hm)d/KSyz(h1, . . . , hm)d.
Define K(h1, . . . , hs)(−d) as K(h1, . . . , hs)(−d)d0 := K(h1, . . . , hs)d0−d for any
d0. Since K(h1, . . . , hm)• is the mapping cone of
K(h1, . . . , hm−1)•(−dm) ×hm→ K(h1, . . . , hm−1)•,
we have the short exact sequence (see [7, 27]):
0→ K(h1, . . . , hm−1)• → K(h1, . . . , hm)• → K(h1, . . . , hm−1)•(−dm)[−1]→ 0.
Thus we can obtain the following long exact sequence:
· · · → H2(K(h1, . . . , hm−1)•)(−dm) ×hm→ H2(K(h1, . . . , hm−1)•)→ H2(K(h1, . . . , hm)•)
→ H1(K(h1, . . . , hm−1)•)(−dm) ×hm→ H1(K(h1, . . . , hm−1)•)→ H1(K(h1, . . . , hm)•)
→ R/〈h1, . . . , hm−1〉(−dm) ×hm→ R/〈h1, . . . , hm−1〉 → R/〈h1, . . . , hm〉 → 0
(1)
2.2 Complexity estimation for a Gro¨bner basis algorithm
In this subsection, we discuss in the standard graded polynomial ring.
A Gro¨bner basis algorithm that computes a Gro¨bner basis of the ideal gen-
erated by a given polynomial system was discovered by Buchberger [4]. In
multivariate cryptography, it is used as an algorithm for solving a system of
polynomial equations and there exist several attacks using a Gro¨bner basis al-
gorithm. The complexity of computing a Gro¨bner basis often dominates the
overall complexity of a attack and its estimation is important to security anal-
ysis against such attacks. For example, the complexity of the Gro¨bner basis
algorithm F4 [15] with a polynomial system in n variables is estimated by(
n+ dslv
dslv
)ω
,
where 2 < ω ≤ 3 is a linear algebra constant and dslv is the solving degree that
is the maximal degree required to compute the Gro¨bner basis. However, the
solving degree is an experimental value. In order to estimate the complexity of
solving a large scale polynomial system appeared in cryptography, we need to
consider a theoretical proxy for the solving degree.
The degree of regularity introduced by Bardet et al. [1] is well-known as
such a proxy. For polynomials f1, . . . , fm in the (standard graded) polynomial
ring F[x1, . . . , xn] with di = deg fi, the following dreg is called the degree of
regularity:
dreg(f1, . . . , fm) = inf{d | 〈f top1 , . . . , f topm 〉d = F[x1, . . . , xn]d} ∪ {∞},
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where f topi is its top homogeneous component of fi. When the top homogeneous
component of the system (f1, . . . , fm) is semi-regular [1] (also see Remark 3.6),
the degree of regularity coincides with the degree Dreg of the first term whose
coefficient is non-positive in the power series∏m
i=1(1− tdi)
(1− t)n .
For any polynomials g1, . . . , gm in F[x1, . . . , xn] such that deg gi = di, it is known
that the following inequality holds [7, 18]:
Dreg ≤ dreg(g1, . . . , gm).
For a semi-regular system, the degree of regularity Dreg tightly approximates the
solving degree. However, for a non-semi-regular system such as a multi-graded
polynomial system, it is known that its Gro¨bner basis is computed within a
smaller degree than the degree of regularity (for example [22]).
The first fall degree introduced by Dubois and Gama [13] is well-known as
a theoretical proxy for the solving degree of a non-semi-regular system. Let
B = Fq[x1, . . . , xn]/〈xq1, . . . , xqn〉 with the standard graded decomposition B =
⊕d≥0Bd. For any h ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn], we denote by h the image of h under the
natural surjection Fq[x1, . . . , xn] → Fq[x1, . . . , xn]/〈xq1, . . . , xqn〉. Let d0 be a
positive integer and h1, . . . , hm ∈ Fq[x1, . . . , xn]d0 . For a positive integer d, we
consider
ϕd : B
m
d−d0 → Bd, (b1, . . . , bm) 7→ b1h1 + · · ·+ bmhm.
Then, for
piij := (0, . . . , 0,−hj , 0, . . . , 0, hi, 0, . . . , 0), τ i := (0, . . . , 0, hq−1i , 0, . . . , 0),
we define the following subspace of SyzB(h1, . . . , hm)d = Kerϕd:
TSyzB(h1, . . . , hm)d := 〈bijpiij , biτ i | bij ∈ Bd−d0 , bi ∈ Bd−d0(q−1)〉Fq .
For any f1, . . . , fm ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn] such that deg fi = d0, the first fall degree
dff (f1, . . . , fm) is defined by
dff (f1, . . . , fm) = inf{d | SyzB(f top1 , . . . , f topm )d 6= TSyzB(f top1 , . . . , f topm )d}∪{∞}.
Ding and Hodges [11] give an upper bound for the first fall degree by construct-
ing a non-trivial syzygy for HFE [25] and prove that it is solved in a quasi
logarithmic time. Verbel et al. [28] construct a non-trivial syzygy of a quadratic
system in the Kipnis-Shamir method [20] for the MinRank problem [17] and
gives a new complexity estimation with the first fall degree for this method.
These evaluations for the first fall degree depend on each cryptosystem, and it
is hard to apply to others.
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For a given polynomial system, the degree of regularity and the first fall
degree is defined on its top homogeneous component. It suffices to show a
homogeneous case for discussing them. Thus, in this paper, we always assume
that a polynomial is homogeneous where a considering grading is not necessary
the standard grading.
3 Estimation using the standard grading
In this section, we introduce a certain value for a polynomial system which
coincides with the first fall degree of a polynomial system over a sufficiently
large field. Then we prove that the first fall degree of a non-semi-regular system
over such a field is smaller than the degree of regularity.
3.1 Theoretical proxy d′ff
In this section, for a polynomial in F[x1, . . . , xn], we only use the standard
grading, i.e. degZ≥0 xi = 1.
We introduce the following definition for computing the first fall degree.
Definition 3.1. For homogeneous polynomials h1, . . . , hm in the polynomial
ring F[x1, . . . , xn], we define d′ff as
d′ff (h1, . . . , hm) = inf{d | Syz(h1, . . . , hm)d 6= KSyz(h1, . . . , hm)d} ∪ {∞}.
Let pi : Fq[x1, . . . , xn] → Fq[x1, . . . , xn]/〈xq1, . . . , xqn〉. By the following lem-
mas, we see that d′ff coincides with the first fall degree dff for a sufficiently large
q.
Lemma 3.2. For homogeneous polynomials h1, . . . , hm ∈ Fq[x1, . . . , xn] such
that deg hi = d0, if q > dff (h1, . . . , hm), then we have dff (h1, . . . , hm) ≥
d′ff (h1, . . . , hm).
Proof. Let B = Fq[x1, . . . , xn]/〈xq1, . . . , xqn〉. Put d = dff (h1, . . . , hm). There
exists ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρm) ∈ Bmd−d0 such that
ρ ∈ SyzB(h1, . . . , hm)d \ TSyzB(h1, . . . , hm)d,
where deg ρi = d − d0 holds as a representative. Then, since
∑m
i=1 ρihi =
0 ∈ Bd, we have ρ1h1 + · · · + ρmhm ∈ 〈xq1, . . . , xqn〉. Since deg ρi + deg hi =
d < q, it follows that ρ1h1 + · · · + ρmhm = 0. If ρ ∈ KSyzR(h1, . . . , hm), we
obtain a contradiction ρ ∈ TSyzB(h1, . . . , hm). Thus ρ ∈ SyzR(h1, . . . , hm) \
KSyzR(h1, . . . , hm). Therefore, we have d ≥ d′ff (h1, . . . , hm).
Lemma 3.3. For homogeneous polynomials h1, . . . , hm ∈ Fq[x1, . . . , xn] such
that deg hi = d0 ≥ 2, if q > d′ff (h1, . . . , hm), then we have dff (h1, . . . , hm) ≤
d′ff (h1, . . . , hm).
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Proof. Let B = Fq[x1, . . . , xn]/〈xq1, . . . , xqn〉. Put d = d′ff (h1, . . . , hm). There ex-
ists ρ ∈ SyzR(h1, . . . , hm)d\KSyzR(h1, . . . , hm)d. In particular, ρ ∈ SyzB(h1, . . . , hm)d.
Although an element biτ i for bi ∈ Bd−d0(q−1) is contained in TSyzB(h1, . . . , hm)d
as generators, they do not appear since Bd−d0(q−1) = 0 by d0 ≥ 2 and q > d.
Thus, if there exists ρ ∈ TSyzB(h1, . . . , hm)d, then ρ =
∑
i,j bijpiij for some
bij where deg bij = d − d0 as a representative. Namely, ρ −
∑
i,j bijpiij ∈
〈xq1, . . . , xqn〉m. By d < q, we have ρ−
∑
i,j bijpiij = (0, . . . , 0). Thus, we obtain a
contradiction ρ =
∑
i,j bijpiij ∈ KSyz(h1, . . . , hm)d. Therefore, dff (h1, . . . , hm) ≤
d.
Proposition 3.4. For homogeneous polynomials h1, . . . , hm ∈ Fq[x1, . . . , xn]
such that deg hi = d0 ≥ 2, if q > min{dff (h1, . . . , hm), d′ff (h1, . . . , hm)}, then
we have dff (h1, . . . , hm) = d
′
ff (h1, . . . , hm).
Proof. When q > dff , we have dff ≥ d′ff by Lemma 3.2. Then q > dff ≥ d′ff ,
and we have dff ≤ d′ff by Lemma 3.3. Thus dff = d′ff . Similarly, when q > d′ff ,
we have the same result.
In Section 4.2, we show that the assumption in this proposition, i.e. q >
min{dff (h1, . . . , hm), d′ff (h1, . . . , hm)}, is satisfied in attacks against actual cryp-
tosystems. In the next subsection, we see that the first fall degree of a non-semi-
regular system is smaller than its degree of regularity under the assumption.
3.2 Diem’s work
In the article [7], Diem investigates a relation between the regularity of a poly-
nomial system and its syzygies.
The following definition is introduced in [7].
Definition 3.5 ([7]). A homogeneous system h1, . . . , hm ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn] is reg-
ular up to degree d if the following multiplication map ×hi by hi is injective for
each i = 1, . . . ,m.
×hi : (S/〈h1, . . . , hi−1〉)d0−deg hi → (S/〈h1, . . . , hi−1〉)d0 ,∀d0 ≤ d
Remark 3.6. In their article [1], Bardet et al. define a semi-regular system for
a homogeneous system. Note that a homogeneous system is semi-regular if and
only if is regular up to degree Dreg − 1 (see [7]). They also call a polynomial
system semi-regular when its top homogeneous component is semi-regular.
Definition 3.7. Let  be a well-ordering on Zs≥0.
1. For two elements a, b of the formal power series ring Z[[t1, . . . , ts]], we
denote a ≡d b if the coefficients of these monomials of degree less than
or equal to d with respect to  are the same.
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2. For a Zs≥0-graded module M over a Zs≥0-graded commutative ring R, i.e.
it has M =
⊕
d∈Zs≥0 Md such that Rd1Md2 ⊆Md1+d2 for any di, we put
Md =
⊕
d0dMd0 .
The regularity in Definition 3.5 is characterized as follows:
Proposition 3.8 ([7]). Let S be the standard graded polynomial ring F[x1, . . . , xn]
with F[x1, . . . , xn] =
⊕
d∈Z≥0 F[x1, . . . , xn]d. For a homogeneous system h1, . . . , hm ∈
S with deg hi 6= 0, the following conditions are equivalent:
1. h1, . . . , hm is regular up to degree d
2. HSS/〈h1,...,hm〉(t) ≡≤d
∏m
i=1(1− tdeg hi)HSS(t)
3. H1(K(h1, . . . , hm)•)≤d = {0}
Since H1(K(h1, . . . , hm)•)d = Syz(h1, . . . , hm)d/KSyz(h1, . . . , hm)d, for the
value d′ff in Definition 3.1, note that we have
d′ff (f1, . . . , fm) = inf{d | H1(K(f top1 , . . . , f topm )•)d 6= 0} ∪ {∞}.
Then we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 3.9. For a non-semi-regular system h1, . . . , hm ∈ Fq[x1, . . . , xn], we
have
d′ff (h1, . . . , hm) + 1 ≤ Dreg(h1, . . . , hm).
Moreover, if deg hi = d0 ≥ 2 and q > min{dff (h1, . . . , hm), d′ff (h1, . . . , hm)}, we
have
dff (h1, . . . , hm) + 1 ≤ Dreg(h1, . . . , hm).
In particular, dff (h1, . . . , hm) + 1 ≤ dreg(h1, . . . , hm).
Proof. Since there is no a non-Koszul syzygy of degree less than or equal to
d′ff (h1, . . . , hm)− 1, we have
H1(K(h1, . . . , hm)•)≤d′ff−1 = {0}.
By Proposition 3.8, this means that h1, . . . , hm is regular up to degree d
′
ff −
1. If h1, . . . , hm is regular up to degree Dreg − 1, it is semi-regular which
contradicts the assumption (see Remark 3.6). Therefore d′ff (h1, . . . , hm) <
Dreg. We assume that d0 ≥ 2 and q > min{dff (h1, . . . , hm), d′ff (h1, . . . , hm)}.
Then, since dff (h1, . . . , hm) = d
′
ff (h1, . . . , hm) by Proposition 3.4, we obtain
dff (h1, . . . , hm) < Dreg. Since Dreg ≤ dreg(h1, . . . , hm) (see [7, 18]), we have
dff (h1, . . . , hm) < dreg(h1, . . . , hm).
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Remark 3.10. For a semi-regular system h1, . . . , hm, we have 〈h1, . . . , hm〉Dreg =
F[x1, . . . , xn]Dreg (see Subsection 2.2). In other words, a Gro¨bner basis algorithm
does not add a new leading monomial of degree lager than Dreg . Thus, for a
semi-regular system, it suffices to compute up to Dreg .
Remark 3.11. For a given polynomial system, a standard signature-based
algorithm avoids zero-reductions caused by its Koszul syzygies and is possible
to give a set of generators for the syzygy module (see [14]). In particular, for
a polynomial system which has a non-Koszul syzygy, such an algorithm must
compute up to the value d′ff .
Remark 3.12. Suppose that the complexity of solving a system in F[x1, . . . , xn]
deduced from an attack against a cryptosystem is given by(
n+ dslv
dslv
)ω
,
and that the complexity at dslv = q satisfies a security. Then, in order to know
the security on dff , it suffices to compute d
′
ff . Indeed, if q > min{d′ff , dff }
that is the assumption of Theorem 3.9, we have dff = d
′
ff , otherwise dff ≥
min{d′ff , dff } ≥ q which means secure from the attack by q. A more actual
discussion for q is given in Section 4.2.
4 Estimation using a multi-grading
In this section, we introduce a value using a multi-degree to approximate the
solving degree and, by extending Proposition 3.8 to a multi-grading, prove that
the first fall degree of a multi-graded polynomial system over a sufficiently large
field is bounded by this value. Moreover, we show that the assumption for the
field order q of our results is satisfied in attacks against actual cryptosystems.
4.1 Extend Proposition 3.8 to a multi-grading
In this subsection, we show that a value in the following definition gives an
upper bound for the first fall degree of a multi-graded polynomial system.
Definition 4.1. Let S be the Zs≥0-graded polynomial ring. For Zs≥0-homogeneous
polynomials h1, . . . , hm in S, we put∑
d∈Zs≥0
adt
d =
m∏
i=1
(1− tdeg hi)HSS(t), (2)
where ]xi = ni and t
d = td11 · · · tdss for d = (d1, . . . , ds), and define DZs≥0(h1, . . . , hm) :=
inf{|d| : ad < 0} ∪ {∞}. Moreover, for a well-ordering ≺ on Zs≥0, we define
DZs≥0,≺(h1, . . . , hm) := inf≺{d | ad < 0} ∪ {∞} where d0 ≺ ∞ for any d0.
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The value DZs≥0 in Definition 4.1 is similar to Dmgd in [23], but our value is
also available for a wighted degree and is a more general concept. Moreover, we
extend Definition 3.1 to the following:
Definition 4.2. For Zs≥0-homogeneous polynomial h1, . . . , hm in the Zs≥0-graded
polynomial ring S with a well-ordering ≺ on Zs≥0, we define d′ff ,≺ as
d′ff ,≺(h1, . . . , hm) = inf≺ {d | Syz(h1, . . . , hm)d 6= KSyz(h1, . . . , hm)d} ∪ {∞}.
If s = 1, we denote this by d′ff ,≺.
For the standard grading, i.e. degZ≥0 xi = 1, the value d
′
ff ,< coincides with
d′ff in Definition 3.1. We can extend Definition 3.5 and Proposition 3.8 to a
multi-grading as follows.
Definition 4.3. Let S be the Zs≥0-graded polynomial ring and  be a well-
ordering on Zs≥0. Then, Zs≥0-homogeneous system h1, . . . , hm is regular up to
degree d if the following multiplication map ×hi by hi is injective for each
i = 1, . . . ,m.
×hi : (S/〈h1, . . . , hi−1〉)d0−deg hi → (S/〈h1, . . . , hi−1〉)d0 ,∀d0  d.
Lemma 4.4. Let S be the Zs≥0-graded polynomial ring and ≺ be a well-ordering
on Zs≥0 compatible with < on Z≥0 such that a ≺ b if |a| < |b|,a,b ∈ Zs≥0.
For Zs≥0-homogeneous system h1, . . . , hm with di := deg hi 6= 0, the following
conditions are equivalent:
1. h1, . . . , hm is regular up to degree d
2. HSS/〈h1,...,hm〉(t) ≡d
∏m
i=1(1− tdeg hi)HSS(t)
3. H1(K(h1, . . . , hm)•)d = {0}
Proof. The proof proceeds in the same way as Proposition 3.8 ([7]). For the
assertion 1 ⇒ 2, we suppose that the assertion holds for m − 1. Then, for any
d0  d, by the injection
×hm : (S/〈h1, . . . , hm−1〉)d0−dm → (S/〈h1, . . . , hm−1〉)d0 ,
we have HSS/〈h1,...,hm〉(t) = HSR(t) − HS〈hm〉R(t) ≡d HSR(t) − HSR(t) ·
tdeg hm = (1− tdeg hm)HSR(t) where R = S/〈h1, . . . , hm−1〉.
For the assertion 2⇒ 3, we suppose that the assertion holds for m− 1. For
any d0  d, the long exact sequence (1) induces an exact sequence
· · · → H1(K(h1, . . . , hm−1)•)d0 → H1(K(h1, . . . , hm)•)d0 →
→ (S/〈h1, . . . , hm−1〉)(−dm)d0 ×hm→ (S/〈h1, . . . , hm−1〉)d0 .
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Then, by an assumption of the induction and the injection ×hm, we have
H1(K(h1, . . . , hm)•)d0 = 0.
For the assertion 3⇒ 1, it suffices to prove the following statement and the
case l = m− 1 in particularly:
H1(K(h1, . . . , hm))d = 0⇒ H1(K(h1, . . . , hl))d = 0, 1 ≤ ∀l ≤ m.
Indeed, by the long exact sequence
· · · → H1(K(h1, . . . , hl)•)→ (S/〈h1, . . . , hl−1〉)(−dl) ×hl→ S/〈h1, . . . , hl−1〉,
the right hand condition for each 1 ≤ l ≤ m gives the injection
×hl : (S/〈h1, . . . , hl−1〉)(−dl)d0 ×hl→ (S/〈h1, . . . , hl−1〉)d0 ,∀d0  d
Suppose that there exists the minimum d′ such that H1(K(h1, . . . , hm−1)•)d′ 6=
0. Then, by |dm| > 0 and d′  d′ − dm,
H1(K(h1, . . . , hm−1)•)(−dm)d′ = H1(K(h1, . . . , hm−1)•)d′−dm = 0.
Hence we have H1(K(h1, . . . , hm)•)d′ 6= 0 by the short exact sequence
H1(K(h1, . . . , hm−1)•)(−dm)d′ ×hm→ H1(K(h1, . . . , hm−1)•)d′ → H1(K(h1, . . . , hm)•)d′ ,
in the long exact sequence (1). Since H1(K(h1, . . . , hm)•)d = 0, we have
d ≺ d′. Therefore H1(K(h1, . . . , hm−1)•)d = 0.
By this lemma, we see that the values in Definition 4.3 is an upper bound
for the first fall degree of a multi-graded polynomial system.
Theorem 4.5. Let S be a the Zs≥0-graded polynomial ring. Then S is Z≥0-
graded with Sd = ⊕d=|d|Sd. For Zs≥0-homogeneous polynomials h1, . . . , hm with
degZs≥0 hi 6= 0, we have
d′ff ,<(h1, . . . , hm) ≤ DZs≥0(h1, . . . , hm).
Moreover, if S = F[x1, . . . ,xs] with degZs≥0 xij = ei, deg hi = d0 ≥ 2 and
q > min{dff (h1, . . . , hm), d′ff (h1, . . . , hm)}, we have
dff (h1, . . . , hm) ≤ DZs≥0(h1, . . . , hm).
Proof. Since the assertion is on Sd = ⊕d=|d|Sd, we may fix a well-ordering ≺
on Zs≥0 in Lemma 4.4 as the graded lexicographic monomial ordering. When
DZs≥0 = ∞, the statement is obviously. If DZs≥0 < ∞, the power series (2) has
a negative coefficient at a certain d such that |d| = DZs≥0(h1, . . . , hm). Then,
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by Lemma 4.4 and the positivity of the coefficients in the Hilbert series, there
exists a non-Koszul syzygy of Zs≥0-degree equal to or less than d with respect
to ≺. Thus d′ff ,< ≤ DZs≥0(h1, . . . , hm) on Z≥0-graded S with Sd = ⊕d=|d|Sd.
Assume that S = F[x1, . . . ,xs] and it is Zs≥0-graded by degZs≥0 xij = ei. For the
standard grading, when d0 ≥ 2 and q > min{dff (h1, . . . , hm), d′ff (h1, . . . , hm)},
we have the last assertion since dff (h1, . . . , hm) = d
′
ff ,<(h1, . . . , hm) by Lemma
3.4.
The following theorem is a more general statement of Theorem 4.5, but it
has an application (see Subsection 4.2).
Theorem 4.6. Let S be the Zs≥0-graded polynomial ring and ≺ be a well-
ordering on Zs≥0 compatible with < on Z≥0 such that a ≺ b if |a| < |b|,a,b ∈
Zs≥0. Then, for Zs≥0-homogeneous polynomials h1, . . . , hm, we have
d′ff ,≺(h1, . . . , hm)  DZs≥0,≺(h1, . . . , hm).
Proof. Since it is obviously for DZs≥0,≺ = ∞, we may assume that d0 :=
DZs≥0,≺(h1, . . . , hm) ∈ Zs≥0. By Lemma 4.4 with the same well-ordering as the
statement, we haveH1(K(h1, . . . , hm)•)d0 6= {0}. It follows that d′ff ,≺(h1, . . . , hm) 
d0.
4.2 Application to multivariate cryptography
In the previous section, we give an upper bound for the first fall degree dff
of a polynomial system f1, . . . , fm whose top homogeneous component is Zs≥0-
homogeneous under the assumption that deg fi = d0 ≥ 2 and
q > min{dff (f1, . . . , fm), d′ff (f1, . . . , fm)}. (3)
In this section, we show that this assumption is satisfied in attacks against
multivariate public key signature schemes Rainbow [12] and GeMSS [5] proposed
in NIST PQC standardization project [24] (see the appendix for notation in this
section).
The Rainbow scheme is a multilayered version of the UOV scheme [21]. The
Rainbow-Band-Separation attack [10] is an attack recovering a secret key of
Rainbow and its complexity is dominated by that of a Gro¨bner basis algorithm
for solving a certain system, say the RBS dominant system. Let v, o1 and o2 be
Rainbow parameters. For n× n matrices Mp1 , . . . ,Mpm corresponding a public
quadratic system (p1, . . . , pm) where n = v+ o1 + o2 and m = o1 + o2, the RBS
dominant system is a quadratic system in F[x1, . . . , xv+o1 , y1, . . . , yo2 ]m+n−1
consisting of
(x1, . . . , xv+o1 , 0, . . . , 0, 1)Mpi
t(x1, . . . , xv+o1 , 0, . . . , 0, 1), 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
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and the first n− 1 components of
(x1, . . . , xv+o1 , 0, . . . , 0, 1)Mp1 +
o2∑
j=1
yj(x1, . . . , xv+o1 , 0, . . . , 0, 1)Mpo1+j .
Since (x1, . . . , xv+o1 , 0, . . . , 0, 1) and
t(1, 0, . . . , 0, y1, . . . , yo2) correspond a row
and a column of secret linear transformations, the Rainbow-Band-Separation at-
tack can recover a part of the secret key by solving the system. Since the polyno-
mial ring S = Fq[x1, . . . , xv+o1 , y1, . . . , yo2 ] is Z2≥0-graded by degZ2≥0 xi = (1, 0)
and degZ2≥0 yi = (0, 1), the top homogeneous component of the RBS dominant
system is contained in Sn−1(1,1) ⊕ Sm(2,0) and is Z2≥0-homogeneous. Then, for the
Z2≥0-graded polynomial ring S, the power series (2) in Definition 4.1 is
(1− t1t2)v+o1+o2−1(1− t21)o1+o2
(1− t1)v+o1(1− t2)o2 . (4)
The paper [22] experimentally shows that the solving degree of the RBS domi-
nant system is tightly approximated by DZ2≥0 in Definition 4.1 which is written
as Dbgd in [22]. According to [22], for the Rainbow parameters Ia and IIIc/Vc
[12] proposed in NIST PQC 2nd round, the best complexities of the Rainbow-
Based-Separation attack are given by DZ2≥0 = 15 and 23/30, respectively. Since
q = 16 and 256 for the parameter Ia and IIIc/Vc, it follows that q > DZ2≥0
holds. In particular, since q > d′ff by Theorem 4.5, the assumption (3) holds
and the second half of Theorem 4.5 holds. Namely, the value DZ2≥0 in the paper
[22] gives an upper bound for the first fall degree dff . Furthermore, Perlner and
Smith-Tone [26] propose a Gro¨bner basis algorithm that arranges polynomials
arisen from the RBS dominant system with respect to a well-ordering on Z2≥0
and further improves the complexity of the attack. Then we can use Theorem
4.6 as a theoretical background of this algorithm. Here note that their theoret-
ical value in [26] is defined by a non-positive coefficient appeared in (4), i.e. it
is different from our value DZ2≥0 , and has another theoretical background based
on such as a big conjecture in Diem [6].
Multivariate signature scheme GeMSS [5] is a minus and vinegar modifi-
cation of the HFE scheme [25]. The MinRank attack with the Kipnis-Shamir
modeling [20] is an attack recovering a secret key of a multivariate cryptosystem
such as GeMSS and Rainbow. Although a public quadratic system of GeMSS is
defined over the field F2 of order two, the complexity of the attack is dominated
by that of a Gro¨bner basis algorithm for solving a certain system over a very
large field, say the KS system. Let n,D, a and v be GeMSS parameters. For
(n + v) × (n + v) matrices Mp1 , . . . ,Mpn−a over F2 corresponding the public
quadratic system (p1, . . . , pn−a), the MinRank attack finds x1, . . . , xn−a in F2n
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such that
Rank
(
n−a∑
i=1
xiMpi
)
≤ r,
where r = dlog2(D − 1)e + a + v. Then, since a found vector (x1, . . . , xn−a)
corresponds to a column vector of a certain linear transform over F2n , the Min-
Rank attack can recover a part of a secret key. For finding x1, . . . , xn−a, the
Kinis-Shamir modeling solves the KS system in F2n which is a quadratic system
in F2[x,k1, . . . ,kc]c(n−a) and is the components of
(0, . . . , 0,
j
1, 0, . . . , 0, kj1, . . . , kjr)
(
n−a∑
i=1
xiMpi
)
, 1 ≤ j ≤ c,
where x = {x1, . . . , xn−a}, kj = {kj1, . . . , kjr} and c ≤ n − a − r. Since the
polynomial ring S = F2[x,k1, . . . ,kc] is Zc+1≥0 -graded by
degZc+1≥0
xi = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and degZc+1≥0
kjl = (0, . . . , 0,
j+1
1 , 0, . . . , 0),
the top homogeneous component of the KS system is contained in
⊕c+1
j=2 S
n−a
e1+ej
and is Zc+1≥0 -homogeneous where ej = (0, . . . , 0,
j
1, 0, . . . , 0). Then, for the Zc+1≥0 -
graded polynomial ring S, the power series (2) in Definition 4.1 is
(1− t0t1)n−a · · · (1− t0tc)n−a
(1− t0)m(1− t1)r · · · (1− tc)r . (5)
The paper [23] experimentally shows that the solving degree of the KS system
from the Minrank problem [17] is approximated by DZc+1≥0
in Definition 4.1 which
is written as Dmdg in [23]. Then they also show that the value DZc+1≥0
which
is smaller than the order q = 256, i.e. the assumption (3) holds, improves the
complexity of the MinRank attack with the Kipnis-Shamir modeling against
Rainbow. In particular, the value DZc+1≥0
in [23] gives an upper bound for the
first fall degree dff . On the other hand, the GeMSS parameter sets for a security
of 2128, 2192 and 2256 proposed in NIST PQC 2nd round take n ≈ 174, 265 and
354 [5], respectively. Thus, for these proposed parameter sets, the order q in the
definition of the first fall degree dff is around 2
174, 2265 and 2354, respectively,
and the complexities at c = 1 of the Kipnis-Shamir modeling are given by
DZc+1≥0
= 26, 44 and 65, respectively. It follows that q  DZc+1≥0 holds. In
particular, q > d′ff by Theorem 4.5, and the second half of Theorem 4.5 holds.
Therefore, this DZc+1≥0
gives an upper bound for the first fall degree dff . In this
case, since each order q satisfies a desired security, we see that it suffices to
compute d′ff by Remark 3.12.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced the value d′ff and saw that the first fall degree dff
coincides with d′ff for sufficiently large fields. By using this, for computing the
first fall degree, we are able to use C. Diem’s result in 2015 [7] which characterizes
the regularity by the syzygies. Then we proved that an upper bound for the first
fall degree of a non-semi-regular system is the degree of regularity. Moreover,
we introduced a value DZs≥0 using a multivariate power series and proved that
an upper bound for the first fall degree of a multi-graded polynomial system is
this value DZs≥0 by extending Diem’s result to the multi-grading.
We showed that the condition for the order of a field in our results is sat-
isfied in the Rainbow-Band-Separation attack and the MinRank attack with
the Kipnis-Shamir modeling against multivariate signature systems proposed in
NIST PQC 2nd round. In particular, our result gives a theoretical background
for the precise security analysis in [22, 23] since their values are specific cases of
DZs≥0 . Consequently, under a reasonable condition for the order of a field, we
cleared a relation between the first fall degree and the degree of regularity and
provided a theoretical method using a multivariate power series for cryptanaly-
sis.
As future works, it is possible to extend the result in this paper to more gen-
eral grading. We need to consider the complexity of a Gro¨bner basis algorithm
within this grading and to investigate its influence on the security of several
other schemes.
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Appendix
For simplicity, we treat only homogeneous polynomials as polynomials and as-
sume that the characteristic of the field F is odd. Then, a quadratic homoge-
neous polynomial in F[x1, . . . , xn] corresponds to a symmetric n×n matrix over
F. A polynomial system (f1, . . . , fm) of F[x1, . . . , xn]m gives a map Fn → Fm
by a 7→ (f1(a), . . . , fm(a)) which is called a polynomial map. A multivariate
public key signature scheme consists of the following three algorithms:
Key generation: We construct two invertible linear maps U : Fn → Fn
and T : Fm → Fm randomly and an easily invertible quadratic map F :
Fn → Fm which is called a central map, and then compute the composition
P := T ◦F ◦U. The public key is given as P . The tuple (T, F, U) is a secret
key.
Signature generation: For a message b ∈ Fm, we compute b′ = T−1(b).
Next, we can compute an element a′ of F−1({b′}) since F is easily invert-
ible. Consequently, we obtain a signature a = U−1(a′) ∈ Fn.
Verification: We verify whether P (a) = b holds.
For a given public key P , the key recovery attack recovers U, T and F such
that P = T ◦ F ◦ U and forges a signature for any message. For matrices Mpi ,
Mfi , MU and MT corresponding pi, fi, U and T where P = (p1, . . . , pm) and
F = (f1, . . . , fm), respectively, we have
(Mp1 , . . . ,Mpm) = (MUMf1
tMU , . . . ,MUMfm
tMU )MT .
The Rainbow-Band-Separation attack takes time to recover a part of MS and
MT of the UOV scheme or its mulit-layerization, i.e. Rainbow. For a public key
P = (p1, . . . , pm) of the HFE scheme and a central n × n matrix Mc = (cij)i,j
over Fqn , we have
(Mp1 , . . . ,Mpm) = (MUMϕM1
tMϕ
tMU , . . . ,MUMϕMm
tMϕ
tMU )M
−1
ϕ MT ,
where Mϕ = (θ
(i−1)qj−1)1≤i,j≤n, Fqn = Fq[θ] and Mk = (cq
k
i−k,j−k). The Min-
Rank attack with the Kipnis-Shamir modeling takes time to recover a column
of M−1ϕ MT of the HFE scheme or its modifications, e.g. GeMSS.
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